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Introduction
A founding assumption in the literature on sustainability transitions is that incumbent systems of production and consumption need to change fundamentally in order for more sustainable technologies to become widely adopted (Rip and Kemp, 1998; Elzen et al., 2004; Bergh et al., 2011; Markard et al., 2012; Dangerman and Schellnhuber, 2012) . Consequently, research in this field has tried to understand where and how these new sustainable technologies emerge and contribute towards transforming systems Hekkert et al., 2007; Jacobsson and Bergek, 2011) . The concept of p ote ti e spa e has ee deplo ed to de ote a ide a iet of niches favourable to new low-carbon technology development in contexts otherwise disadvantageous towards them, such as R&D settings (Belt and Rip, 1987) , geographical locations (Coenen et al., 2009; Verbong et al., 2010) , NGOs and environmental user groups (Verheul and Vergragt, 1995; Truffer, 2003) and grassroots communities (Seyfang and Smith, 2007; Ornetzeder and Rohracher, 2013) .
When innovations are empowered to eak out of thei p ote ti e spa es, some induce far-reaching implications for wider institutions, infrastructures and other structural dimensions of the selection environment. This makes them potentially path-breaking innovations. This paper aims to make a contribution to this particular topic.
The niche concept has been most prominent in the Multi-Level Perspective (Geels, 2002) and Strategic Niche Management frameworks (Schot & Geels, 2008; Raven et al., 2010) .
These related frameworks presume sustainable technologies are disadvantaged and require strategic support to protect them against premature rejection by investors, customers and users whilst the performance, price and infrastructures for these technologies develop. In evolutionary terms, novel technological varieties with more environmentally friendly and socially just characteristics struggle to develop under unfavourable, multi-dimensional selection pressures (i.e. i u e t so io-te h i al egi es ) (Nill and Kemp, 2009 ).
Protective spaces, where these selection pressures can be reduced or modified, are required in order that sustainable technological developments have a chance to become sufficiently robust to eventually compete with incumbent technologies and/or exert an influence over wider selection environments.
Until recently, however, analysis has rarely paused to consider how protective spaces are created, maintained and, if at all, removed. Spaces have tended to be taken as given, and analysis focused on the development of technological expectations, actor networks and social learning processes that nurture technological development within those spaces . Recognising this lacuna, Smith and Raven (2012) developed a framework conceptualising the construction of p ote ti e spa e as consisting of three features: shielding, nurturing and empowering. The aim of this paper is to develop the framework by discussing three propositions regarding the ways in which those who aim to promote a certain low-carbon technology, i.e. technology advocates, mobilise and maintain protective space. Our concept of advocates does not only include technology developers, but also other interested actors such as lobby groups, environmental NGOs, policy makers and politicians, potential users, etc.
Our analysis also responds to calls for more politically informed analyses of transition dynamics and system transformation more generally (Aklin and Urpelainen, 2013; Hendriks and Grin 2007 , Shove and Walker 2007 , Scrase and Smith 2009 , Meadowcroft 2011 , Kern 2012 Cheon and Urpelainen, 2013; Hess, 2013) . In order to shed light on the politics of protective space, the propositions adopt an actor-oriented perspective (Ferguson et al. in press; Farla et al., 2012) focussing on the strategic work that technology advocates undertake when attempting to construct, maintain and expand protective spaces. As such, we address the following research question:
How do technology advocates attempt to create, maintain and expand protective space for developing their path-breaking low-carbon technologies?
Published research provides a conceptual approach to this issue (Smith and Raven 2012) , and some isolated case studies have explored it empirically (Verhees et al. 2013; Smith et al. 2014; Walter, 2012; Boon et al., 2014; Kern, et al. 2014a; Kern et al., 2014b; Verhees et al., 2014) . As yet, however, there has been little synthesis across individual cases that might provide a more robust basis for u de sta di g the d a i s of p ote ti e spa e . To address this gap we conduct a meta-analysis of case studies of three different types of low carbon electricity-generating technologies in two jurisdictions committed to energy transitions. The technologies are solar photovoltaics (PV), offshore wind (OSW), and carbon capture and storage (CCS). The jurisdictions are the UK and the Netherlands. The methodology section justifies these choices.
The paper begins in section 2 with a discussion of protective space and develops three propositions about the role of technology advocates. After outlining the methodological approach in section 3, the paper continues in section 4 with the analysis reviewing the propositions against evidence from the case studies. The paper ends with conclusions and implications for research in section 5.
Protective space and low-carbon technology advocacy: three propositions
In their review of the niche literature, Smith and Raven (2012) focused specifically on the concept of protective space. Here we provide a brief summary of the conceptualisation of protective space arising from this literature review. The summary informs three propositions that better allow the framework to be confronted with empirical evidence across multiple case studies. We note here that the propositions are used to guide our comparative research through pattern matching similar to ways suggested by Yin (1994) and to provide lenses for interpretative analysis (Stake, 1995) . Given the qualitative, historical nature of the case studies, we do not undertake statistical analysis. The methodology section further explains how the propositions were used in the comparative analysis.
Smith and Raven found that the literature emphasised two out of three features of protective spaces important for the development of low-carbon technologies. These functional features were shielding and, in particular, nurturing. A third function, that of empowering the niche innovation, was less developed in the literature. The propositions in this paper focus on the least developed parts of the framework, i.e. shielding and empowerment. Propositions on nurturing have already received substantial attention across cases and empirical domains (Schot and Geels, 2008) .
Shielding
Shielding is defined as processes that hold at bay certain selection pressures from mainstream selection environments " ith a d 'a e , :
. As such, niche spaces are shaped through a variety of measures and mobilisations that provide sites for technological development relatively free of selection pressures prohibiting such activity more generally elsewhere. These regime selection pressures are multi-dimensional rather than merely economic and arise from industrial structure, technologies and infrastructures, knowledge base, markets and user practices, public policies and political power, and the cultural significance of the regime form (Geels 2002; Rip & Kemp 1998) . Therefore, shielding can take multi-dimensional forms too.
Shielding can be passive in the sense that favourable spaces already exist before and independently of the strategic action by technology advocates, such as off-grid settings (Verbong et al., 2010) or environmentally concerned communities (Truffer, 2003) .
Protective spaces can also be created more actively, through the purposeful provision of facilities like demonstration programmes or strategic firm investments (Pinkse et al., 2014; Sushandayo and Magnussen, 2014) .
Because path-breaking technologies will have little support initially (Aklin and Urpelainen, 2014 ), advocates will have to take advantage of pre-existing passive spaces that afford some limited shielding from selection pressures and offer resources and conditions that enable some kind of innovative development to the technology. Where those developments show promise, then technology advocates are eventually able to enrol others into the active construction of further strategic spaces for more dedicated, active forms of protection of the technology such as policy programs (Lovell, 2007; Diaz et al., 2013; Raven et al., 2011) .
In sum, shielding can be achieved by technology advocates through mobilisation of passive spaces such as geographic locations (e.g. off-grid sites), generic innovation schemes or cultural milieus (e.g. environmentalists) or through more active measures such as technology-specific public policies, strategic industrial research, market subsidies, and political support (see Smith and Raven 2012, Table 1 ). 1 These observations lead us to formulate the following proposition:
P1: Technology advocates initially use pre-existing passive spaces for technology development before strategically creating dedicated active spaces.
The next section discusses how protective spaces enable nurturing of path-breaking innovations. Given that most studies on niche development focus on nurturing, we do not develop a proposition in this section, but only briefly synthesize previous studies.
Nurturing
The mobilisation of passive spaces and creation of active spaces for innovative activity contribute to the second feature of protective spaces, which are the processes for nurturing the innovation. Analysis of nurturing is the most developed aspect of the strategic niche management literature. Nurturing consists of interacting processes for social learning, articulating technological expectations, and social network development. The niche literature suggests that: (a) expectations contribute to successful technology development when they are robust (shared by many actors), specific, and of high quality (substantiated by ongoing projects); (b) social networks contribute when their membership is broad (plural perspectives) and deep (substantial resource commitments by members); and (c) learning processes are broad, covering issues on a variety of socio-technical dimensions, not only accumulating facts, data and first-order lessons, but also generating second-order learning about alternative ways of valuing and supporting the niche (Schot and Geels, 2008) .
Nurturing processes develop iteratively across located socio-technical experiments and th ough a e e gi g i stitutio al field at the glo al i he le el that is o stituted networks of intermediary actors, such as industry platforms, user-groups, policy bodies, business and NGOs, and others (Geels and Raven 2006; Geels and Deuten 2006) .
Empowering
The and-transform e po e e t. Empowerment consequently denotes two conceptually distinct developments of a niche innovation that, in practice, can be present simultaneously.
Fit-and-conform e po e e t is defined as processes through which low-carbon technologies become competitive with mainstream socio-technical practices in otherwise unchanged selection environments " ith a d 'a e , :
. Fit-and-conform strategies involve advocates improving the socio-technical competitiveness of their technology along conventional regime lines. That is, it will perform profitably in existing markets, and does not require far-reaching changes to institutions, infrastructures, skills and knowledge bases, and so forth. It involves advocates demonstrating codified performance to audiences consisting of existing standards agencies, consultancies, industrial bodies, sponsoring government departments, institutional investors, and so forth. Technology advocates promoting fit-and-conform strategies try to convince these audiences on the basis of the same assessment criteria as those currently used by these audiences. Shielding measures are seen only as temporal, which will be removed after the development of the low-carbon technology has converged with price-performance levels of the incumbent technologies.
I o t ast, stretch-and-transform e po e e t is defined as processes through which mainstream selection environments are changed in ways that make them more amenable for the niche innovation. Stretch-and-transform empowerment seeks to reframe the rules of the game, and reform institutions that influence prevailing performance criteria. Shielding measures will come to be seen as new norms for sustainability, for example, and the kinds of criteria that count will become more aligned with the advocated technology. An example of this is to evaluate electricity-generating technologies not just according to costs per KWh produced, but also based on the associated emissions of each KWh produced. The audience for this kind of work is more likely to operate in opinion forming arenas in civil society, politics and business (Smith & Raven, 2012 : 1033 .
Technology advocacy of a stretch-and-transform kind not only requires narratives to be persuasive to these wider audiences (Hajer and Versteeg, 2005) . Technology advocates also need to be politically powerful to stretch-and-transform regime-structures, and this power rests on resource attributes, experience, institutional positions, and connections with other influential actors (Cheon and Urpelainen, 2013) . Stretch-and-transform empowerment is more difficult than fit-and-conform, e ause … a epta e … is o e likel he the innovation is perceived to meet the goals that are consonant with already widely accepted goals (Johnson et al., 2006: 72) . As such, we propose that:
P2: Fit-and-conform strategies are more prevalent than stretch-and-transform strategies.
The socio-political empowering of low-carbon technology advocates
Conceptualising protective spaces in the form of shielding, nurturing and empowering relates niches to the evolutionary requirements of a developing low-carbon technology (variation, selection and retention). However, these features, if they arise at all, are shaped by technology advocates attempting to construct supportive actor networks and mobilise institutional and infrastructural opportunities (Phillips et al., 2004) . Smith and Raven suggest that for empowerment in particular, narrative work and networking undertaken by technology advocates is central. Networks are built and institutional opportunities for empowerment developed through arguments about the past performance of the technology, the current realities, and future improvement possibilities.
These narratives need not only portray technological performance as positive, but also make sense of the technological implications in relation to broader social, political and economic agendas (Geels and Verhees, 2011) . Successful narratives bridge positive expectations about the technology, drawing upon inward-oriented nurturing work, with outward-oriented problematisations of incumbent regimes and identification of institutional opportunities. These outward-oriented, socio-political narratives are directed, for example, to arguments about the employment and potential industrial opportunities of the technology, or how it can address carbon emissions or energy security concerns (Garud and Gehman, 2012; Smith & Raven, 2012 : 1032 Benford and Snow, 2000) .
As such narratives are strategic devices for technology advocates that gain legitimacy only when they succeed in framing the developing technologies as solutions to specific regime problematisations (Jensen, 2012) . Often those who need to be enrolled are not directly or deeply involved in the actor networks developing the low-carbon technology, nor are they particularly interested in their details (Law and Callon, 1994 ). Yet often these actors have incumbent regime positions with decisive control over institutional and infrastructural adjustments necessary for stretch-and-transform empowerment. So there is work to be done in committing them, which often involves contestation and conflict (Jorgensen, 2012) , as well as finding mutual ground for aligning diverse interests behind the technology in order to change the regime selection environment.
The ability to craft credible and valid narratives about the technology in terms meaningful to powerful socio-political actors and their agendas, increases the te h olog s legiti a in the eyes of those actors, and thereby the chances of changing regime selection environments in ways beneficial to the niche innovation (Suchman, 1995) . This leads us to the following proposition.
P3: To achieve empowerment technology advocates will attempt to link socio-technical narratives to prominent socio-political agendas.
In the following section we will discuss the methodological approach taken in this paper.
Methodology
One of the methodological weaknesses of the sustainability transitions field is the high reliance on single technology, single country case studies (Geels, 2011) . This paper has adopted a different approach, namely a meta-analysis, which utilises six case studies in two countries in order to confront our propositions with empirical evidence and thereby contribute to the further development of the o eptualisatio of p ote ti e spa e i a systematic and empirically validated way. Meta-analyses are often used to synthesise insights across a variety of quantitative studies in fields like medicine, education and psychology (Borenstein et al. 2011 ), but its main logic can also be applied to qualitative work (Weed, 2005) : namely that single (case) studies taken in isolation can be misleading and therefore a systematic approach to synthesise insights is desirable (Petticrew and Roberts 2008) .
Our aim is to confront the three propositions with the six cases, thereby offering systematic and empirically-based insights into creating, maintaining and expanding protective space.
Ou app oa h follo s Eise ha dt s (1989) suggestion of finding generic patterns and mechanisms by constantly comparing the data and theoretical constructs articulated in the propositions in an iterative process. Table 1 shows the key theoretical concepts, their
definitions and examples of the kind of evidence used. We position our research design and use of propositions within the interpretive social science tradition (Stake, 2010) . Propositions are not used for articulating causal relationships between dependent and independent variables, but to provide guidance for the researchers to collect and explore data, and shape meaning about processes and patterns found across cases. Propositions are thus part of the theoretical perspective, a way to refine the research question and a focal instrument to the researcher, rather than statements that will be tested, falsified or verified. In sustainability transitions research, propositions have been used in similar ways by for instance Geels and Schot (2007) . As such, in the results section, we explore how the cases speak to the propositions in qualitative ways. In the concluding section we develop an interpretation of how the evidence compares to each proposition across all six cases.
Technology-based cases were selected on the basis of maximum variation (Flyvbjerg 2006) , but within a similar regime-context, which is to say we chose technologies whose characteristics differed markedly from each other, generating a rich variety of empirical information such that any patterns emerging across that variety suggest generic features of protective space (see table 2 ). We reflect in the discussion on the limitations of choosing cases within the same empirical domain. A key criterion for selecting these cases is their relative dista e to the e isti g ele t i it regime, i.e. the necessary adaptations in the electricity regime for empowering these technologies is potentially largest for solar-PV. CCS arguably requires the least far-reaching changes, whilst offshore wind energy is in the middle. However, it should be noted that there may be substantial diversity in the actual socio-technical forms that materialise through long-term niche developments. Solar-PV may materialise as a roof-top, communityowned energy technology shaping substantial changes in energy markets and infrastructures, but it can also come in the form of utility-owned, large scale sola fa s .
CCS, on the other hand, was not understood initially by its technology advocates to be very disruptive to the incumbent electricity regime (rather as an end-of-pipe technology leaving intact most of the existing infrastructures, institutions and actor constellations), but as we will show in our analysis CCS turned out to be more disruptive in terms of the required knowledge-base and cultural acceptance. The disruptiveness of these technologies needs to be assessed through analysis rather than assumed from the beginning as the ongoing sociotechnical configuring shapes the relative distance or disruptiveness vis a vis the regime, as seen in the PV example above.
Each of the case studies used for this meta-analysis was conducted by the authors of this paper and followed the same methodology. A longitudinal, qualitative case study approach was used that allowed us to reconstruct the processes of development of each technology (Yin 1994, George and Bennett 2005) . The case studies gathered evidence from documentary sources (policy and stakeholder documents, other grey literature, news articles, company announcements, existing academic literature, etc), data on deployment, R&D funding, pilot or demonstration schemes, and semi-structured interviews with stakeholders involved in the development of the technology (drawn from academia, policy makers, firms, green NGOs). All material gathered was coded for evidence of our preliminary concepts in our analytical framework. Detailed descriptions of individual case study methods and more detailed analysis of actor strategies and agency have been documented elsewhere (Verhees et al., 2013; Smith et al., 2014; Kern et al., 2014a) . Although the process was less linear than the proposition suggests (i.e. some active shielding in the early stages, some passive shielding in the later stages, and some degree of overlap in between) Dutch and UK PV developments clearly show a shifting emphasis from passive to active shielding.
Dutch OSW research goes back to the mid-1970s, at which time its advocates managed to secure some active shielding (of marginal scale) through energy research programmes, but their efforts were mostly ignored. Interest in OSW intensified as a result of societal controversies surrounding the planned roll-out of onshore wind in the early 1990s. The flight offsho e a thus e i te p eted as a atte pt to se u e a passi el p ote ted spa e for wind power: a location where antagonistic residents could not delay or halt construction. However, from the late 1990s onward, active shielding was sought and found as well (e.g. the first large-scale pilot project was initiated and partially financed by the government; differentiated production subsidies with a relatively high rate for OSW were provided; new offshore rules and regulations were made to facilitate deployment).
In Dutch OSW development both passive and active shielding have clearly played prominent roles at various times. Although the process has been somewhat more complex than the pu el se ue tial p o ess f o passi e to a ti e suggested i the p opositio e.g. so e
minor active shielding has been present from the beginning, and passive protection continued to play a role), a shifting emphasis from passive to active can be detected. for Dutch CCS development. The same is also true for UK CCS developments. While there was some pre-existing legacy of clean coal programmes and a unit within government responsible for them (shaping the go e e t s ea l thi ki g a out CCS), the technical, political and social issues with CCS are quite distinct from the technologies covered by these earlier programmes, which meant that advocates from the beginning were trying to obtain CCS-specific active spaces. They were successful in this endeavour (as evidenced by the setting up of initiatives like dedicated CCS research networks, providing pilot and demonstration project funding, R&D investments, incentives for deployment through the Electricity Market Reform, cost reduction taskforce, etc).
In sum, in most of the cases technology advocates have made use of pre-existing passive spaces initially, and early attempts to create more active spaces failed, whilst they managed more successfully to create active spaces for furthering the development of their technology in later stages. CCS, however is -within our limited case study selection -a notable exception in both countries, where much of the shielding has been of active forms from the beginning.
In sum, compared with case study evidence, the original proposition is ambiguous and needs to be nuanced: the relationship is much less linear than the proposition suggests.
Analysis of the CCS cases suggests that some technology advocates are able to create active shielding very early on. This might be the case because of strong international support for CCS (e.g. through the IPCC special report, G8, and IEA) as well as support by powerful incumbents (see P3 below).
4.2 Proposition 2. Fit-and-conform strategies are more prevalent than stretch-andtransform strategies.
During the development of Dutch solar PV advocates have mostly implemented fit-andconform strategies aimed at enabling solar PV to compete with mainstream electricity generation technologies after shielding is removed. In the mid-1970s, they only spoke of PV in terms of the dominant electricity generation paradigm (large-scale centralised) but because it failed this comparison on price, advocates searched for new passive spaces (e.g.
autonomous systems in the developing world where PV was argued to be an economically and technically viable alternative for diesel generators). When the successes of these p oje ts ha ged the go e e t s opi io a out PV i the late s, ad o ates sta ted articulating the expectation that price drops and efficiency improvements would render PV competitive. In The Netherlands as well, a similar fit and conform view was prominent in the 1990s. There is also some evidence of stretch-and-transform strategies such as opening up tax proceeds for subsidising PV purchase, but most were terminated in the early 2000s (Verhees, Raven et al. 2013) . Only recently, PV has started to witness more intensive growth in the Netherlands, mostly constituted by a new cooperative movement and a number of successful collective buying initiatives. Most of these initiatives still occur within unchanged selection environments, but it is increasingly recognised that the future perspective of this movement depends on stretching and transforming institutional contexts, e.g. by allowing cooperatives to become real producers rather than a collective customer for existing energy utilities, or allowing PV owners to place panels on roofs they do not own. Such changes have been promoted by PV advocates in the context of the 2013 national Energy Agreement. However, it still has to be seen how this agreement will play out in practice. The OSW sector promised to focus on cost-reducing innovations in return for government support. Attempts to materialise stretch-and-transform strategies were unsuccessful (e.g.
the choice of licensing OSW farms on a first-come-first-served basis proliferated above a more encompassing institutional reform based on a concession system). Hence, costs rather than broader sustainability criteria determined the fate of Dutch OSW.
In the UK OSW advocates employed both fit-and-conform and stretch-and-transform strategies. OSW has been pushed as a large-scale, low carbon technology which fits well into the existing electricity system but is currently too expensive and therefore requires temporary protection. However, alongside financial support for R&D, testing infrastructure and pilot projects to make the technology more competitive, a coalition of large business actors, public bodies and policy makers were successful in significantly shaping the selection environment to make it more amenable to OSW. This includes the Electricity Market Reform Dutch CCS advocates have mostly pursued fit-and-conform strategies as well. Advocates argued that CCS was a proven technology (in the oil sector) that would be competitive under conventional economic criteria because of knowledge spill-overs from other sectors and the presence of depleted gas fields. Moreover, no radical changes to the existing system would be required: CCS would be an end-of-pipe solution. These fit-and-conform narratives eso ated politi all . Although the go e e t i itiall ~ sa CC" as a a kup pla which would not be essential for meeting Kyoto obligations, it quickly (~2005) came to be seen as a necessary bridge to a renewable energy system, and later (~2010) as inevitable for achieving post-2020 emissions objectives. Nevertheless, this political support has so far not resulted in deployment, as pilot projects became heavily contested at the local level.
Counter-narratives employed framed CCS as producing unknown environmental risks (instead of addressing known ones), as uneconomical (because of high infrastructure costs and indefinite monitoring), and as blocking renewables (instead of bridging to them). By successfully attacking the fit-and-conform essence of the pro-CCS narrative arguing that CCS would require stretch-and-transform of the existing electricity system, CCS became politically less attractive.
In the UK CCS advocates mainly utilised fit-and-conform strategies, too. The most commonly used argument in favour of CCS is that for climate change reasons there is no alternative to using it because of the necessity of the continued use of fossil fuels for energy security and cost reasons. In this logic CCS fits well into the existing fossil fuel based, centralised electricity infrastructure so no radical change is required. However, like in the Netherlands this fit with the existing systems is also a liability politically with the public and NGOs who are not keen on CCS as part of an energy transition. The legitimacy of CCS rests on achieving cost reductions and there is a variety of government initiatives to foster these (e.g. cost reduction taskforce; £125m CCS innovation programme). Advocates promote the narrative that CCS will be competitive with other low carbon technologies by the early 2020s.
However, there are also significant attempts at stretching and transforming existing selection environments. The Electricity Market Reform is a significant shift in the institutional framework of the utility industry, which is meant to incentivise CCS investment (alongside nuclear and OSW). Also internationally there have been important rules changes which UK CCS advocates have lobbied for and tried to shape so that they enable CCS deployment such as the EU CO2 storage directive (to provide clarity on and limit liabilities) and the change of the London Convention (to allow sub-seabed storage of CO2).
Overall, in relation to the proposition we conclude that we observe attempts at both strategies for all cases, but also find that fit-and-conform strategies enrol establiashed interests more easily. We argue that this is because fit-and-conform is likely to be the more strategic choice by niche advocates when convincing powerful actors to provide the niche with the necessary resources whereas stretch-and-transform requires political power to reframe dominant assessment criteria and to institutionalise new rules. The UK OSW case shows how a coalition of influential actors was actively supporting OSW and successfully pursued both fit-and-conform and stretch-and-transform strategies which led to a rapid growth of the niche. 4.3 Proposition 3. To achieve empowerment technology advocates will attempt to link socio-technical narratives to prominent socio-political agendas.
Empirical evidence shows that in all cases, advocates have attempted to secure resources by constructing narratives that link their preferred technologies to broader socio-political age das, a d pe fo i g these efo e a audie e of esou e controllers. All technologies in both countries have been linked to agendas around energy security, climate change mitigation and job creation through narratives that articulate how the technologies will contribute to these socio-political goals. However, the cases also show that a narrative which resonates with broader agendas does not always result in the mobilisation of significant resources. In all cases, we see that success or failure also depends on the composition of the networks articulating the (same) narratives, i.e. not just what is said , but also who is saying it .
Narrative resonance
In the case of UK OSW, narratives were created that resonated well with the go e e t s wider agenda of re-balancing the economy away from finance towards manufacturing sectors, building on existing offshore-engineering skills and the prospects of attracting largescale inward investments (in this case by international turbine manufacturers) which would boost job creation and economic growth in a recession. In the Dutch OSW case, too, ad o ates a ati es ha e shifted a ou d to e phasize the se to s jo pote tial i espo se to the go e e t s o e a ket-oriented policy style and its withdrawal of support for OWS, which it (at that poi t i ti e ie ed p i a il as a too expensive e issio s itigatio optio .
But whereas offshore wind ticks all the boxes in terms of aligning socio-technical narratives with wider socio-political agendas (climate change mitigation, renewable energy targets, and jobs), it is more difficult to make such a case to the same extent for CCS. Both in the UK and The Netherlands, supportive narratives for CCS refer to preserving existing jobs in the fossil fuel industry and portray the technology as a central contribution to climate change targets given the continued reliance on fossil fuels, but obviously CCS does not help either atio s government in achieving the EU 2020 renewable energy targetsunless CCS would become seen as a renewable energy technology much like organic waste was re-framed as a renewable energy source in the mid 1990s (Raven and Verbong, 2007) .
Also for PV, both in the UK and in The Netherlands, advocates proved capable of articulating plural narratives in flexible ways appropriate to circumstance and audience. Over a 40 year period they had to interpret shifting energy (policy) contexts and represent PV in favourable terms, such as providing solutions to new policy priorities, e.g. as an alternative form of energy after the oil crisis in the 1970s or as a solution to climate change from the mid-1990s
onwards. Nevertheless, certainly in the UK case, resonance of pro-PV narratives with wider socio-political agendas was lower than it was for OSW. Given the high costs of PV compared to conventional electricity, narratives about job creation have long been used to promote the technology (like OSW) but mostly with very limited results (unlike OSW). One reason is that the majority of jobs created from a PV roll-out mainly concerns installation rather than manufacturing jobs as PV modules are traded globally and are now mainly manufactured in China 3which does not have the same appeal to policy makers compared to the promise of turbine factories located in deprived areas in the North of England and Scotland in the case of OSW.
Enrolling powerful actors
The Dutch PV case shows that enrolling powerful actors into these narratives is crucial as well. Although over time the PV narrative in The Netherlands has been quite flexible, it did not change significantly between the early 1970s and late 1980s, at which point the Dutch go e e t e e theless sudde l s it hed to a ie of solar PV as a realistic option. This was in large part due to the fact that several early PV advocates had risen into influential positions by then, and that Shell had entered the solar PV sector, as many of its foreign competitors had done (Verbong et al, 2001) . Recent developments in the Dutch OSW case show a similar dynamic: while its advocates have created a compelling narrative about the sectors job potential, the fact that this narrative was articulated by a consortium that included some very large offshore construction contractors and energy companies was a key factor in the recent uptake of offshore wind into the Dutch top sector policy (a policy paradigm initiated by a government that had previously withdrawn support for OSW rollout Table   3 ). The cases suggest that proposition 1 needs reconsideration. The PV and OSW cases demonstrate a shifting emphasis from passive to active shielding, but the relationship is less linear than suggested by this proposition (some active shielding in the beginning, some passive shielding in later stages). The CCS cases even suggest an opposite pattern as articulated in the proposition, i.e. CCS was actively shielded from its inception. Notably, in the Netherlands, social struggles in later phases pushed CCS back into more passive shielding, resulti g i a o e offsho e , and demonstrating the opposite development as suggested by the proposition. It seems the mobilisation of passive and construction of active spaces follows a much more non-linear pattern, which is dependent on broader levels of social and political legitimacy (see proposition 3).
In relation to proposition 2, we conclude that whilst evidence reveals attempts to stretchand-transform throughout the entire case study periods, fit-and-conform has been the dominant narrative. A notable acceptation is the UK OSW case. UK OSW advocates employed both fit-and-conform and stretch-and-transform strategies equally. Interestingly, this was the case in which deployment rates have been largest, which suggests that empowerment of niche innovations cannot occur without stretch-and-transform strategies a finding that echoes some of the findings of earlier niche-studies (Hoogma et al., 2002) .
Nevertheless, the UK CCS case has demonstrated that although the basic legitimacy of CCS rests on achieving fit-and-conform cost reductions, arguably there have been significant attempts to stretch-and-transform as well, but without leading to substantial deployment.
The Dutch CCS case suggests a key-mechanism in the complex relationships between narratives and successful deployment. While our methodology mostly focussed on narratives of technology advocates, the Dutch CCS case shows how anti-narratives successfully attacked the fit-and-conform nature of CCS arguing that CCS would require stretch-and-transform of the existing electricity system, making CCS politically less attractive. We suggest that the interplay between narratives and anti-narratives deserves more attention in future research.
Our research has further nuanced proposition 3. Case study evidence suggests a more complex relationship between socio-technical narratives and socio-political agendas.
Notably, in all cases we found narratives emphasising similar claims such as benefits for the climate, jobs, energy security, national industrial and export opportunities, and technological efficiency improvements leading to future cost reductions. It is striking just how similar these narratives are across cases and countries. Moreover, our cases suggest success or failure also depends on the composition of the networks articulating these narratives, in particular the participation of legitimate actors (as in the eyes of the resource providers) is suggested to be critically important.
We also note the following methodological limitation. All cases are from the energy domain and only two jurisdictions, which suggest one should be careful about generalisation to other empirical fields. Arguably the energy domain has some specific features. Energy is in most countries a key topic of national policy interests, because disruptions in energy provision can have major social consequences. For example, public actors often own technical networks, which are core to the operation of the system. In many countries, such as in the Netherlands, energy provision makes a major contribution to the national treasury.
These features suggest that changing energy systems inherently requires substantial infrastructural, institutional and policy reforms, which makes it a case-in-point for studying socio-political work of technology advocates, but essentially limits its generalizability to empirical fields with substantially different features. Future research could investigate protective space dynamics in other empirical fields and different jurisdictions.
Although our immediate conclusions are about the three propositions, the broader aim of this paper was to investigate technology advocacy in making, maintaining and removing protective space. Although we were not able to produce a definite solution to this issue, we argue that our findings nevertheless have important implications, especially for niche-based transition approaches such as strategic niche management. Our findings highlight the i po ta e of oade i g the f a e o k s a al ti al fo us f o the th ee i he-internal processes around the development of expectations, actor networks and social learning processes that nurture technological development within those spaces, to include those more outward-oriented processes by which the spaces in which such nurturing occurs are constructed in the first place and how they are deconstructed (if at all). By broadening the s ope f o u tu i g to shieldi g, u tu i g a d e po e i g , and being more sensitive to the socio-political strategies of technology advocates, we believe we have contributed to the emergence of a more comprehensive understanding of niche development patterns.
